Israel conducted significant negotiations to recognize Hamas rule, enter long-term ceasefire shortly before Oct 7 - report

On June 11, 2023, a few short months before the Hamas-led terror attack in southern Israel, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) Unit distributed the "Hudna Plan,” intended to promote a long-term arrangement with Hamas in Gaza. 

The document, exposed by Channel 12 News, was written by the unit's commander, Maj.-Gen. Ghassan Alian, along with former Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi. Drafting of the document also involved the cooperation of the Shin Bet and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Southern Command. A copy of the document was also sent to the defense minister at the time, Yoav Gallant. 

The proposal came out of a May 2023 meeting in Cairo, in which Egyptian officials presented a proposal for a ceasefire with Hamas. 

If accepted, the plan would have established a policy recognizing Hamas rule in Gaza, granting it greater legitimacy and near-sovereignty over the enclave. However, from Hamas' side, this was all a clever ploy. 

Even as Hamas was holding meetings with Egyptian mediators for a “hudna” [Arabic for temporary truce], Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was setting the date for Hamas’ “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” — Oct. 7, 2023. 

The document exposes how the “conception” as Israelis call the widely-held mistaken understanding of Hamas’ intentions, had become accepted throughout the security agencies. 

"The combination of conditions and the convergence of vectors in the various arenas create an opportunity to advance the idea of a hudna through the partners – Egypt and Qatar,” the document said.

“These conditions ensure long-term stability and a reduction in Hamas's buildup in the Strip. It is evident that Hamas is interested in promoting understandings equivalent to a sort of agreement, a move that could strengthen the influence of the more moderate elements within Hamas's leadership.” 

The proposal was part of the strategy of Sinwar, who had devised a plan in 2022 to trick Israel into believing that Hamas was concerned about future conflict with Israel and preferred to focus on economic development and consolidating its rule in Gaza. 

“There is a deep concern within Hamas about being drawn into another escalation at the present time; it is highly deterred by this (including the leaders of the hawkish faction and the military wing), yet, on the other hand, it fundamentally fears losing the civilian progress made over the past two years,” the document continues.

“The two most recent operations – ‘Breaking Dawn' and 'Arrow Shield' – reflect Hamas's commitment, alongside an initial recognition of hopes for some improvement.” 

A day after the COGAT plan was distributed within IDF leadership, senior security officials conducted a discussion titled “The Security Regime in the Gaza Strip.” 

The IDF was apparently convinced, following Operation Guardian of the Walls, that Hamas had been deterred. During that operation, Hamas did not join Palestinian Islamic Jihad in attacking Israel, and did not participate in the fighting against the IDF in an official capacity. 

This led the security leadership to believe that Hamas was distancing itself from PIJ and attempting to behave more like a government. 

“Islamic Jihad is challenging Hamas' new policy vis-à-vis Israel,” they assessed. 

In the document, COGAT proposed “actual acceptance of the Hamas regime and granting it permission to establish its influence in the Palestinian arena, alongside expanding its ties with regional factors.” 

Believing their assessment to be correct, the document writers advised casting the planned hudna as an Egyptian initiative, rather than an Israeli one, to ensure greater acceptance of the plan among the Palestinians. 

About a month after the IDF’s discussion of the plan, it was presented to the coalition cabinet in its first meeting discussing Gaza. The plan was presented by the National Security Council as an effort to maintain calm and bring long-term stability. 

After a discussion chaired by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the cabinet decided to adopt the COGAT plan while insisting on certain Israeli demands also laid out in the document. 

Hamas' rhetoric, and its potential decision not to join the PIJ in recent fighting, were part of a broader strategy crafted by Sinwar. This strategy aimed to deceive the Israeli government and security agencies into believing the group had been deterred, all while secretly preparing for the deadliest attacks Israel had faced since the 1948 War of Independence.

Documents from COGAT demonstrate the significant role that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) played in Hamas’ deceit. For almost a decade before Oct. 7, UNRWA facilitated the transfer of funds to Gaza, with the Israeli government transferring around $160 million annually. 

This happened because the government assumed that UNRWA was working as a stabilizing influence in Gaza. Netanyahu himself worked to ensure continued funds to UNRWA after the U.S. government cut funding in 2018, the Channel 12 report said. 

UNRWA staff were later proven to have taken part in the Oct. 7 attacks.

The release of the document provoked a series of attempts by various figures involved to assign blame. 

Following the Channel 12 report, COGAT released a statement saying it works to “implement the policy of the political echelon.” 

“The unit [COGAT] has worked and is still working to implement the policy of the political echelon in the territories of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, based on the operational and intelligence assessment of the situation,” the statement read. “This is a document presenting an Egyptian proposal from June 2023 and not an independent Israeli initiative. In this case too, the discussions took place in accordance with the policy of the political echelon.” 

COGAT director Maj.-Gen. Ghassan Alian is the only remaining non-political figure directly associated with the events of Oct. 7 who is yet to resign, or even publicly announce his responsibility for the failures. 

Gallant responded to the Channel 12 report by calling for a state commission of inquiry. 

“A state commission of inquiry must be established to investigate everything that happened at least in the decade preceding October 7. It must investigate me and all political and military figures who serve and have served in relevant positions,” Gallant said. 

The Prime Minister’s Office also released a statement, attempting to deflect blame onto the military and Shin Bet heads. 

“In a series of discussions chaired by the Prime Minister, all security chiefs expressed support for advancing understandings with Hamas and examining a long-term arrangement that would ensure stability,” the statement read. 

“The chief of staff assessed that escalation was not desirable and that improving Gaza’s economy aligned with Israeli interests. The Shin Bet head determined that Hamas had no interest in another round of fighting. The defense minister similarly concluded that improving Gaza’s economy was in Israel’s interest,” the PMO statement continued. 

“The prime minister concluded that Hamas's demands should not be accepted, and approved a limited increase in the number of workers only, similar to the minimal recommendation presented by COGAT, along with promoting readiness to thwart Hamas leaders in Gaza. At no stage did the prime minister instruct to advance negotiations for a long-term arrangement or to provide economic incentives beyond what has been said.” 

The statement continued, again pointing to remarks by Shin Bet head Ronen Bar, saying that “two days before the Oct. 7 massacre,” the Shin Bet recommended a long-term arrangement for the supply of humanitarian aid be established “as a gesture for the opening of talks in good faith,” and called for sending the recommendations on to the IDF and the Defense Minister. 

“These recommendations did not reach a decision before the Prime Minister and were never approved by him,” the statement concluded.